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NOTE
THE "EXTREME AND HYPOTHETICAL"*
COME TO LIFE: CHURCH OF THE
LUKUMI BABALU AYE, INC. v.
CITY OF HIALEAH
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution prohibits the government from placing burdens on the exer-
cise of religion.1 While this Clause confers a seemingly absolute right
upon individuals to practice religion, it has been subject to considerable
debate and redefinition by the United States Supreme Court over the
past two hundred years.2 Since the early 1960s, individuals have been
able to protect their religious beliefs and practices from burdensome state
regulation by requesting an exemption from the enforcement of the of-
fending law.' Ideally, the Supreme Court was to evaluate these claims
using a strict scrutiny standard of review, 4 and provide exemptions in
those cases where the state's burden on an individual's religious practice
did not further a compelling state interest using the least restrictive
means.
5
* Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
see infra text accompanying note 119.
1. The Religion Clause of the First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
2. See generally Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 115, 119-20 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Crossroads] (tracing the origins
and development of the Free Exercise and Religious Establishment Clauses, focusing on
the numerous decisions made during the Warren and Burger Courts); Michael W. McCon-
nell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1409, 1412-15 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins] (identifying some of the key
concerns behind the shifting free exercise doctrine).
3. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-05 (1963) (holding that any law which
even indirectly burdens the practice of an individual's religion must be justified by a com-
pelling state interest); McConnell, Origins, supra note 2, at 1413 ("Free exercise litigation
since Sherbert has consisted almost entirely of requests for exemption rather than for gen-
eral invalidation of restrictive laws.").
4. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-05 (holding that free exercise claims for exemptions
should be justified by compelling state interests using the least restrictive means).
5. McConnell, Origins, supra note 2, at 1412-13. See infra notes 77-107 and accompa-
nying text (describing free exercise cases following the compelling interest test).
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In the decades following its institution of a strict scrutiny standard of
review, the Court rarely applied the standard in a consistent and reliable
manner.6 When faced with requests for exemptions from federal pro-
grams ranging from Social Security withholding,7 use of federal lands,'
and military policy,9 the Court abandoned its strong support of individu-
alized exemptions for religious groups. Moreover, when state legislatures
created statutory exemptions to their laws to accommodate local religious
practices, the Court struck these exemptions as violative of the Establish-
ment Clause. 10 By the mid-1980s the use of strict scrutiny to provide indi-
vidualized exemptions to neutral laws was seen by both scholars and
members of the Court as an unworkable and unfair compromise to reli-
gious groups" as well as a slippery slope, opening the door to thousands
of religious groups desiring exemptions from even the most neutral laws.
6. See Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REv. 701, 701 (1986)
("The constitutional law of religion is 'in significant disarray."' (citation omitted)).
7. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (discussed infra notes 88-95 and accom-
panying text).
8. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (dis-
cussed infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text).
9. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that the Free Exercise
Clause did not require the military to provide an exemption to its dress code to allow a
service person to display a religious symbol while on duty).
10. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that a Texas
statute providing an exemption from sales tax for religious literature violated the Estab-
lishment Clause); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 722-23 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (asserting that serious Establishment Clause concerns were raised where the
majority granted an exemption from state unemployment compensation laws to a Jeho-
vah's Witness whose religion forbade his participation in the production of weapons during
the Vietnam War). Compare Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (de-
claring unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause a statutory provision prohibiting
employers from firing religious adherents for refusing to work during their sabbath) with
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause required
that states pay unemployment compensation to religious adherents fired for refusing to
work during their Sabbath). See generally Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem
of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933, 940 (1989). In his
article, Professor Lupu asserts:
For several reasons, however, [free exercise] claims are often deeply troubling.
First and foremost, they typically require exemption from or cessation of some
government policy that the political branches have ratified and that has legiti-
mate, secular justification. Behind every free exercise claim is a spectral march;
grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge, and you will be confronted with an
endless chain of exemption demands from religious deviants of every stripe. Sec-
ond, an affirmative response to free exercise claims is sometimes thought to col-
lide with establishment clause limitations on the state's power to favor religion.
Id. at 947 (footnotes omitted).
11. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451. In Lyng, the Court stated:
However much we might wish that it were otherwise, government simply could
not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and
desires .... The First Amendment must apply to all citizens alike, and it can give
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Faced with such controversy, the Supreme Court refined its standard of
review of free exercise claims, granting deference to the legislature in vir-
tually all cases involving requests for an exemption from "neutral laws of
general applicability."' 2 While the new test appears to result in a clearer
standard for resolving free exercise challenges, in reality it has greatly
decreased the protection that the Free Exercise Clause historically has
provided to religious groups.' 3
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,4 the
Supreme Court once again examined the meaning of neutrality in free
exercise jurisprudence. Lukumi involved a challenge to several Florida
municipal ordinances that banned the sacrificial killing of animals.'" The
challenge was raised by a group of Santeria practitioners intending to es-
tablish a church within the Hialeah city limits. 6 The Santeria religion
first gained public attention in Hialeah in 1987, when Ernesto Pichardo, a
high Priest of Santeria, decided to provide a forum for his followers to
practice their religion openly. 7 When Pichardo and his following
purchased property in the city in order to establish a Church of Santeria,
to none of them a veto over public programs that do not prohibit the free exercise
of religion.
Id.; see also William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free
Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. R-s. L. REv. 357 (1989).
12. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-80 (1990) (holding that exemptions
from neutral laws of general applicability were not required for religious adherents); see
infra notes 107-24 and accompanying text (providing a detailed discussion of the Smith
case).
13. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 25.
Professor Laycock argues that the Smith holding nullifies the protection historically af-
forded to religious groups by the Free Exercise Clause. Id. By doing so, he claims, the
Supreme Court opens the door to widespread oppression of groups that cannot otherwise
avail themselves of the protection of the political process. Id. at 25-30.
14. 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
15. Id. For the text of the ordinances, see infra note 18.
16. 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1476 (S.D. Fla. 1989), affd, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd,
113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
17. Id. Santeria is a mixture of the African Yoba religion and Catholic icons. Id. at
1469. It has been practiced for over 400 years, primarily by African slaves in the Carib-
bean. Id. Though widespread, Santeria is largely an underground religion as are several
other Afro-Caribbean religions such as Voodoo, Macumba, and Palo Mayombe. Id.
A central tenent of the Santeria religion is animal sacrifice. Id. According to oral tradi-
tion, Santeria devotees are required to participate in sacrificial rites on numerous occasions
during the year to commemorate holidays as well as "life cycle events" such as birth, death,
and marriage. Id. at 1470. One such occasion is the initiation ceremony, a rite of passage
marked by an eight day celebration when 24 to 56 animals are sacrificed and eaten. Id. at
1473-74. Animal sacrifice also plays a large role in the religion's healing ceremonies. Id.
The Santeria believe that a person's disease can be transferred to the body of an animal
which is then disposed of or placed on a sacrificial alter. Id. at 1474.
Santeria remains a highly decentralized religion, typically practiced in private homes by
small groups of people. Id. at 1470. Santeria priests are trained through oral tradition and
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the Hialeah City Council responded by issuing a series of ordinances that
expressly banned the sacrificial killing of animals.18 Challenging the con-
stitutionality of the ordinances, the Church argued that the city enacted
by observing sacrifices; there are large differences of interpretation of the manner by which
animals are to be obtained, prepared, killed, and discarded. Id.
The migration of Santeria practitioners to the United States shares many common char-
acteristics with the American Pilgrim migration during the Seventeenth Century. During
the 1950s and 1960s, Cuban natives fled their homeland en masse, to avoid the new Castro
regime. Id. Many of these migrants settled in South Florida, where they resumed their
religious practices. Id South Florida is now the home to approximately 50,000-60,000
Santeria practitioners as well as an unknown number of practitioners of other Afro-Carib-
bean religions. Id.
For further background on the Santeria religion and its ceremonial practices, see JOSEPH
M. MURPHY, SArERIA: AN AFRICAN RELGION IN AMERICA (1988).
18. Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at 1476. The Florida statute regarding cruelty to animals
states:
(1) A person who unnecessarily overloads, overdrives, torments, deprives of
necessary sustenance or shelter, or unnecessarily or cruelly beats, mutilates, or
kills any animal, or causes the same to be done, or carries in or upon any vehicle,
or otherwise, any animal in a cruel or inhumane manner, is guilty of a misde-
meanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or by a fine of not
more than $5,000, or both.
(2) A person who tortures any animal with intent to inflict intense pain, serious
physical injury, or death upon the animal is guilty of a felony of the third degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or by a fine of not more than $10,000, or
both.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.12 (West 1987).
The district court cited to section 828.27 of the Florida code that limits municipal ordi-
nances. Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at 1476. This statute was significantly altered by the Florida
legislature in May 1991. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.27(6) (West 1991).
The Hialeah sacrifice laws were based on the following official resolutions:
RESOLUTION OF THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF
HIALEAH, FLORIDA, EXPRESSING THEIR POLICY CONCERNING
RITUALISTIC ANIMAL SACRIFICES.
WHEREAS, the residents and citizens of the City of Hialeah, Florida, have
expressed great concern regarding the possibility of public ritualistic animal sacri-
fices in the City of Hialeah, Florida...
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE MAYOR AND CITY
COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF HIALEAH, FLORIDA, that:
Section 1. It is the policy of the Mayor and City Council of the City of Hialeah,
Florida, to oppose the ritual sacrifices of animals within the City of Hialeah,
FLorida [sic]. Any individual or organization that seeks to practice animal sacri-
fice in violation of state and local law will be prosecuted.
HIALEAH, FLA., RESOLUTION No. 87-90 (1987).
RESOLUTION OF THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF
HIALEAH, FLORIDA, REITERATING THE CITY'S COMMITMENT TO A
PROHIBITION AGAINST ANY AND ALL ACTS OF ANY AND ALL
RELIGIOUS GROUPS THAT ARE INCONSISTENT WITH PUBLIC
MORALS, PEACE OR SAFETY.
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the ordinances in a "mob atmosphere," with the specific intention to pre-
vent the establishment of a Santeria church in the area.19
WHEREAS, residents and citizens of the City of Hialeah have expressed their
concern that certain religions may propose to engage in practices which are incon-
sistent with public morals, peace or safety, and
WHEREAS, the Florida Constitution, Article I, Declaration of Rights, Section
3, Religious Freedom, specifically states that religious freedom shall not justify
practices inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE MAYOR AND CITY
COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF HIALEAH, FLORIDA, that:
1. The City reiterates its commitment to a prohibition against any and all acts
of any and all religious groups which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or
safety.
HIALEAH, FLA., REsoLurnON No. 87-66 (1987). The resulting Hialeah code section defin-
ing the slaughter or sacrifice of animals states: "Sacrifice means to unnecessarily kill, tor-
ment, torture or mutilate an animal in public or private ritual or ceremony, not for the
primary purpose of food consumption." HIALEAH, FLA., CODE § 6-8 (1987). The code
section outlawing the possession of animals for sacrifice states:
(a) No person shall own, keep or otherwise possess, sacrifice or slaughter any
sheep, goat, pig, cow or the young of such species, poultry, rabbit, dog, cat or any
other animal, intending to use such animal for food purposes.
(b) This section is applicable to any group or individual that kills, slaughters or
sacrifices animals for any type of ritual, regardless of whether or not the flesh or
blood of the animal is to be consumed.
HIALEAH, FLA., CODE § 6-9 (1987). The code also restricted the slaughter of animals to
statutorily regulated groups:
(a) Sacrifice. It shall be unlawful for any person, persons, corporations or as-
sociations to sacrifice any animal within the corporate limits of the City of Hi-
aleah, Florida.
(b) Slaughter. It shall be unlawful for any person, persons, corporations or
associations to slaughter any animal on any premises in the City of Hialeah, Flor-
ida, except those properly zoned as a slaughter house and meeting all the health,
safety and sanitation codes prescribed by the city for the operation of a slaughter
house. This subsection shall not apply to any person, group or organization that
slaughters, or processes for sale, small numbers of hogs and/or cattle per week in
accordance with an exemption provided by state law.
HIALEAH, FLA., CODE § 6-10 (1987).
19. Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at 1478; see also Petitioner's Brief at 3, Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993) (No. 91-948) ("These
ordinances were enacted 'in a mob atmosphere.' Angry speakers denounced the Church
and misstated its practices. One speaker said that if the Council permitted the Church to
worship, the country would 'regress into paganism."' (citations omitted)).
The Church also alleged that the City violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) by harassing the
Church and delaying sanitation permits and electrical service. Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at
1487. Section 1983 claims are brought by individuals or groups alleging that a governmen-
tal entity has deprived them of due process, in violation of the U.S. Constitution. See
SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES LITGATION: A GUIDE TO § 1983
(1979 & Supp. 1992). The district court dismissed this claim, because the Church could not
point to any official policy mandating discriminatory treatment. Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at
1487-88.
1994]
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The city defended the ordinances, arguing that animal sacrifice posed a
serious threat to the health of Hialeah residents.20 It contended that im-
proper disposal of 12,000-18,000 animal carcasses by Santeria practition-
ers attracted rats and insects, thereby increasing the likelihood of
communicable disease in the area.2' In addition, the city argued that it
sought to protect the Church members themselves, who had been known
to eat sacrificed animals without first inspecting the animals for disease.22
Furthermore, the city sought to prevent what it viewed as cruel treatment
to the animals both before and during the sacrifice.23
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
upheld the ordinances under the compelling interest test first articulated
by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner.24 The district court held that
the ordinances were facially neutral and that any incidental impact on
Santeria's religious practice was justified by the city's compelling interest
in protecting the health and public welfare of its residents and preventing
animal cruelty.25 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the decision of the district court26 without apply-
ing the newly established standards for analyzing of religious exercise
cases developed in Employment Division v. Smith.27
The United States Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Eleventh
Circuit, holding that Hialeah's ordinances were invalid because they spe-
cifically targeted religious practice for disparate treatment, as even the
law's "secular ends" were enacted with the object of prohibiting conduct
motivated by religious belief.28 The majority opinion, written by Justice
Kennedy, explained that while the ordinances were facially neutral,
"[f]acial neutrality is not determinative., 29 Analyzing the Hialeah ordi-
nances individually and in tandem, the majority found that in fact they
were not neutral and generally applicable as required by Smith because
they outlawed almost exclusively the religious practices of the Santeria
followers.3"
20. Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at 1474.
21. Brief of Respondent at 32-36, Lukumi (No. 91-948).
22. Id. at 32.
23. Id. at 37-40.
24. Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at 1467; see infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Sherbert decision).
25. Lukumi, 723 F. Supp. at 1476-77.
26. 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993); see infra
notes 107-24 and accompanying text (discussing the Smith decision).
27. 494 U.S. 872 (1988).
28. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2222.
29. Id. at 2227.
30. Id. at 2228-30.
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In separate concurring opinions, Justices Brennan and Souter agreed
with the outcome, but challenged the validity of the Smith analysis. Jus-
tice Souter argued that the Court's dismissal of the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review in Smith was based on a misconstruction of free exercise
precedent, and failed to follow the Supreme Court's established practice
of handing down a new constitutional interpretation.31 Justice Souter
concluded that the Smith opinion was of little precedential value and, as
such should be ignored in future cases.32 Similarly, Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justice O'Connor, agreed with the majority's conclusion, but
defended the application of a strict scrutiny analysis for evaluating free
exercise challenges.33
This Note examines the Lukumi case and its potential effect on free
exercise jurisprudence, first tracing the free exercise cases that estab-
lished the compelling interest test. This Note then examines the rise and
fall of this test, culminating in the highly deferential standard enunciated
in Employment Division v. Smith.34
This Note argues that the Smith Court's focus on the neutrality of a
state restriction on religious practice fails to effectuate the purpose of the
Free Exercise Clause by eliminating judicial deference to the constitu-
tional right to religious freedom. Consequently, the Smith analysis ac-
cords less deference to this fundamental right than the most trivial claim
under the Equal Protection Clause. This Note argues that the Lukumi
Court, by refusing to expand upon a narrow construction of "neutrality"
under the Free Exercise Clause, perpetuates the uncertainty surrounding
the Smith decision. This Note concludes that given the Constitution's ex-
plicit recognition of a fundamental right to practice religion, and the im-
portance of its purpose in ensuring minority religions their right to
practice unencumbered by excessive governmental regulation, the Court
should create a more expansive definition of its neutrality and general
applicability requirements.
I. HISTORY OF FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
The Free Exercise Clause, incorporated into the Constitution in 1791, is
essentially a reiteration of the religion clauses found in many state consti-
tutions of the time.35 By the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the
states recognized that the federal government should afford special pro-
31. Id. at 2246-48 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2250-52 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
34. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
35. For example, the Virginia Bill of Rights, drafted in 1776, served as a prototype for
many other state constitutions. It stated:
19941
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tection to religion. The extent of such protection, however, was the sub-
ject of great dispute.36 This dispute concerned the role of religion in
lawmaking and the extent to which the church and the state should re-
main discrete and separate entities.37
While the Free Exercise Clause undoubtedly protects the right to reli-
gious belief, the extent to which government can regulate religious prac-
tice has been the source of continuous controversy.38 Early free exercise
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of dis-
charging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or vio-
lence; and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion,
according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to
practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each other.
VA. BILL OF RIGHTS OF 1776 art. 16, reprinted in 7 TiE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrru-
TIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 3814 (F. Thorpe ed., 1909).
36. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1158 (2d
ed. 1988) (outlining the doctrines and themes of First Amendment jurisprudence).
37. The religion clauses have not been subject to exhaustive historical analysis. In
recent times, however, several scholars of the First Amendment have attempted to define
the ideas surrounding these clauses at the time of their ratification. For example, Arlin
Adams and Charles Emmrich have identified three major outlooks on religious liberty
existing at the time of the drafting of the Constitution. ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J.
EMMRICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1990). The theory of separate
church and government was first articulated by the "Enlightenment Separationists," in-
cluding Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison. Id. at 22. These individuals
supported minimal contact between government and religion, illustrated by Jefferson's fa-
mous characterization of the "wall of separation" between church and state. Id. at 24. The
second group consisted of the "Political Centrists" such as George Washington, John Ad-
ams, John Marshall and others. Id. They believed that religious beliefs (particularly Chris-
tian beliefs) formed "an essential cornerstone for morality, civic virtue, and democratic
government." Id. at 26. The Political Centrists advocated religious-based legislation, and
in some cases even mandatory religious practice. Id. at 27-28. The third group was the
"Pietistic Separationists," including William Penn and Roger Williams. Id. at 28-29. These
individuals advocated governmental promotion of voluntary religious worship. Id. at 29.
While the Pietistic Separationists argued for some degree of separation between religion
and government, these thinkers believed that the government should actively support indi-
viduals in their pursuit of religious beliefs. Id. at 30. To this end, the Pietistic Separation-
ists argued that the government should set an example of morality and civic virtue in its
acts rather than explicitly endorsing or requiring a particular religious activity. Id. For a
more indepth analysis of the historical roots of the religion clauses, see McConnell, Ori-
gins, supra note 2, at 1409.
38. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (asserting that the Constitution absolutely protects reli-
gious beliefs as well as those actions having solely religious significance). Writing for the
Smith majority, Justice Scalia contended:
It would be true, we think ... that a State would be "prohibiting the free exercise
[of religion]" if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are en-
gaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they
display. It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for example, to ban the casting of
"statues that are to be used for worship purposes," or prohibit bowing down
before a golden calf.
Id. at 877-78 (alteration in original).
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cases prohibited governmental restrictions of religious belief but permit-
ted governmental regulation of religiously motivated conduct.
A. Early Cases: The Belief-Action Debate
1. The Origin of the Belief-Action Analysis in Free Exercise Clause
Jurisprudence: Reynolds v. United States
In Reynolds v. United States,39 the Supreme Court first articulated what
was later to be known as the "belief-action" dichotomy in free exercise
jurisprudence. The Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting bigamy de-
spite the burdens it placed on the religious practice of Mormons.' In its
analysis, the Court asserted that while government can never regulate
religious belief, religious actions were fully amenable to governmental
regulation.41 The Reynolds Court concluded that religious groups should
not have the power to usurp the government's authority to protect all of
its citizens.42
The Reynolds doctrine interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to grant
individuals protection from governmental regulation of religious belief,4'
while according the government absolute discretion to regulate relig-
iously motivated conduct." The rule handed down by the Court in Reyn-
olds remained law for more than sixty years, and was subject only to
limited exception when the Court felt compelled to grant concessions to
religious groups.
2. The Reynolds Standard in 20th Century Free Exercise
Jurisprudence
While the Reynolds belief-action distinction remained the rule in free
exercise analysis, subsequent cases proved that the Court's distinction be-
tween the right to believe and the more limited right to act was not as
clear as first articulated in Reynolds. In Cantwell v. Connecticut,4 5 the
Supreme Court struck down a state law that required religious groups to
receive certification before they could solicit donations or sell religious
39. 98 U.S. 145 (1878), overruled by Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
40. Id. at 166.
41. Id. In Reynolds, Chief Justice Waite sought to draw the line between permissible
and impermissible accommodation of religion. "Laws are made for the government of




44. Id. The Court concluded: "To permit [polygamy] would be to make the professed
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every
citizen to become a law unto himself." Id. at 167.
45. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
1994]
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literature door to door.' In evaluating the religious group's claim, a
unanimous Court struck down the certification requirement because it
impinged on the Jehovah's Witnesses' freedom of belief by requiring that
a state official inquire into the sincerity and authenticity of the applicant's
religious beliefs.47
The Court in Cantwell concluded that a state cannot frivolously outlaw
the right to believe in a religion.' While the Court upheld Reynolds'
belief-action distinction, it blurred the line between belief and action by
allowing constitutional protection for acts carried out in furtherance of
religious belief.49 By allowing religious expression through solicitation,
the Cantwell decision implied that the absolute right to believe in a reli-
gion may also entail at least a limited right to act upon those beliefs."0
The distinction between belief and action was further blurred in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,5 where the Court granted
an exemption to a West Virginia Board of Education regulation that re-
quired students to salute the American flag.52 The regulation was chal-
lenged by a group of Jehovah's Witnesses, many of whose children were
expelled from school because their religion forbade such a practice.
53
The Court struck down the West Virginia law on First Amendment
speech and religion grounds,54 as well as on Fourteenth Amendment due
46. Id. at 300. The law was challenged by three Jehovah's Witnesses who were ar-
rested and charged with violation of the certification laws and for disturbing the peace. Id.
at 301-02. The State of Connecticut asserted that the statute's regulation of solicitation was
necessary to prevent fraud and breaches of the peace caused by the religion's inflammatory
messages. Id. at 300. The statute read:
No person shall solicit money, services, subscriptions or any valuable thing for
any alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause, from other than a mem-
ber of the organization for whose benefit such person is soliciting or within the
county in which such person or organization is located unless such cause shall
have been approved by the secretary of the public welfare council.
CONN. GEN. STAT § 6294 (n.d.), amended by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 860d (Supp. 1937),
quoted in Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 301-02.
47. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 307.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 303-04.
50. Id. at 304. In addition, the Court hinted that any infringement on the right to
believe had to be justified by some type of substantial state interest. Id. In its opinion, the
Court found that the Connecticut legislature could find a less restrictive way to prevent
fraud and breaches of the peace by these religious groups than to evaluate the sincerity of a
groups religious beliefs. Id. at 306-07.
51. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
52. Id. The challenge was brought by parents of the schoolchildren, seeking to enjoin
the state from enforcing the provision. Id. at 629.
53. Id. at 629-30.
54. Id. at 634-35.
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process grounds,55 asserting that a state cannot compel individuals to act
in affirmation of a belief offensive to their religious convictions.5 6
Despite its limited concessions to religious actions in Cantwell and Bar-
nette, the Court maintained the belief-action distinction well into the lat-
ter half of the twentieth century. 7 It was not until Justice Brennan's
dissent in the 1963 case Braunfeld v. Brown5" that members of the Court
indicated their willingness to abandon the belief-action distinction in
favor of a standard more accommodating to religious action.
3. The Beginning of the End for the Belief-Action Distinction:
Braunfeld v. Brown
Despite earlier concessions permitting some religiously motivated con-
duct, until the early 1960s the Supreme Court generally deferred to
lawmakers when deciding free exercise challenges. This attitude was
most clearly demonstrated in Braunfeld v. Brown. In Braunfeld, the
Court upheld a city's mandatory Sunday closing law despite the burdens
the law indirectly placed on the business practices of Orthodox Jewish
merchants.' ° The Court held that the purpose of the law was to guaran-
tee a uniform day of rest for all citizens, a goal too important to compro-
mise in accommodation of a small-scale religious group.6' The Court
noted that although this case was distinguishable from Reynolds v. United
55. Id. at 638.
56. Id. at 631. The Court ruled that the state's goal of "'inspir[ing] patriotism and love
of the country"' was not so concrete and important that it should be allowed to infringe on
the essential freedom protected by the First Amendment. Id. (quoting Minersville Sch.
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604 (1940)).
57. In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the Court struck down a Maryland law
that required elected officials to take an oath declaring their belief in God as a condition
for holding office. Id. at 489-90. The law was challenged by the nominee for state Notary
Public. Id. at 489. In holding the law unconstitutional, the Court emphasized that a gov-
ernment can neither compel one to profess one's beliefs nor condition state benefits upon
professing allegiance to certain beliefs. Id. at 493. In so doing, the Court affirmed its
conviction in absolute protection of freedom to believe, stating that "neither [a state nor
the federal government] can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as
against those religions founded on different beliefs." Id. at 495 (footnote omitted).
58. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 601. The Petitioners argued that the Orthodox Jewish religion required
them to close their businesses on Saturdays in observance of the Sabbath, and that closing
their business on Sunday would put them at a competitive disadvantage with non-Jewish
merchants who were able to conduct business on at least the first day of the weekend. Id.
61. Id. at 607. Specifically, the Court refused to allow an exemption because other
merchants would be tempted to allege religious reasons for staying open on Sunday to gain
an economic advantage over those who were required to close. Id.
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States62 in that the law did not prohibit a religious practice that was itself
violative of the public interest, it extended Reynolds' level of deference to
the legislature's indirect or incidental proscription of religious action.
63
Disagreeing with the majority's analysis, Justice Brennan argued that a
law that severely burdened a religious practice is indistinguishable from a
law explicitly outlawing a religion.' In either context, Justice Brennan
argued that the Court should strike down a state law that is not justified
by a substantial state interest. 65 As such, the city's interest in having all
citizens rest on the same day did not justify the heavy burden placed on
practitioners of the Orthodox Jewish faith.66 Justice Brennan concluded
that states must justify the burdens placed religious practice by neutral,
nondiscriminatory laws, for a law's neutrality should not, in itself, justify
such a heavy burden on religious practice.
67
B. The Compelling Interest Test: Sherbert v. Verner
Three years after the decision in Braunfeld, the Supreme Court radi-
cally changed its analysis of free exercise challenges to facially neutral
laws. In Sherbert v. Verner,61 the Supreme Court demonstrated its will-
ingness to grant exemptions to individuals whose religious practices were
burdened by government regulations. 69 The case concerned a Seventh
Day Adventist who was fired for refusing to work during her Sabbath.
Subsequently, she was refused unemployment compensation benefits be-
cause her religious justification for refusing subsequent employment did
not constitute "good cause" as required by state law.70
Justice Brennan, now writing for the majority, reasoned that although
the law did not expressly force the Petitioner to abandon her religious
62. 98 U.S. 145 (1878), overruled by Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1982). See
supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (discussing the Reynolds decision).
63. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605-06. "To strike down, without the most critical scrutiny,
legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion, i.e., legisla-
tion which does not make unlawful the religious practice itself, would radically restrict the
operating latitude of the legislature." Id. at 606.
64. Id. at 613 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). Similarly, in a separate opinion, Jus-
tice Stewart found the Sunday closing laws presented the Petitioner with the "cruel choice"
of "choos[ing] between his religious faith and his economic survival .... It is a choice which
I think no State can constitutionally demand." Id. at 616 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 613 (Brennan, I., concurring).
66. Id. at 614. For Justice Brennan, the burdens placed on the religious group could
not be justified by even a facially neutral statute. Id. at 612.
67. Id.
68. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
69. Id. at 405-06.
70. Id. at 399, 401. The Petitioner was a member of the Seventh Day Adventist
Church whose religion prohibited work on Saturdays. Id. at 399 n.1. The Petitioner sought
relief from the law in the form of an individual exemption. Id. at 401.
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beliefs, it did threaten to have such an effect because it forced her to
choose between her religion and her receipt of government benefits.
71
An exemption was warranted unless the state could show that a compel-
ling state interest justified its refusal to grant an exemption for religiously
compelled discharge and that its refusal reflected the least restrictive
means of achieving that result.72 The Court concluded that the state's
interest in preventing fraudulent compensation claims was not sufficient
to justify the heavy burden placed on the Seventh Day Adventist's reli-
gious practice.73
In sum, the Sherbert holding changed free exercise adjudication in two
major ways. First, it acknowledged that religiously motivated action re-
quires a degree of constitutional protection comparable to that afforded
to religious belief.74 Second, it provided a new approach to litigants wish-
ing to challenge burdensome laws on free exercise grounds. Prior to the
71. Id. at 404.
72. Id. at 406-07. Justice Brennan stated that the State's refusal to recognize the Peti-
tioner's religious practices as a legitimate explanation for her refusal to work on Saturdays
was to treat religious reasons for discharge as less valid than any other reason. Id. at 407.
In applying this test, Justice Brennan stated "ilt is basic that no showing merely of a ra-
tional relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive
constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occa-
sion for permissible limitation."' Id. at 406 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945)) (alteration in original).
73. Id. at 407. There has been some dispute over whether the Braunfeld decision re-
tains any precedential value after the Sherbert holding. This is especially troublesome in
light of Justice Scalia's reliance on Braunfeld in the majority opinion in Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1989). In his dissent in Sherbert, Justice Harlan argued that the
majority's holding could not be squared with Braunfeld. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 421 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). Justice Harlan argued that the burden on religion permitted in Braunfeld
was much heavier than that facing the Petitioner in Sherbert, and yet the Court allowed an
exemption in the latter case but not the former. Id. For Justice Harlan, the majority's
opinion in effect overruled Braunfeld. Id. In a separate concurrence, Justice Stewart
agreed with Justice Harlan that Braunfeld had been overruled, stating his belief that
Braunfeld represented bad law. Id. at 418 (Stewart, J., concurring in result). In a later
case, McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), Justice Brennan conceded that to the extent
that Braunfeld stood in conflict with Sherbert the Braunfeld holding was overruled. Id. at
633 n.6.
74. In Sherbert, the Court refused to look to the direct-indirect distinction that it had
previously drawn in granting deference to state enactments. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404-05.
With regard to indirect burdens placed on religious practitioners by a state enactment, the
Court regarded the state's refusal to accommodate religion (when it could have done so
with ease) as hostility to religion. Id. "For '[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede
the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions,
that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being
only indirect."' Id. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607) (alteration in original); see
TRIBE, supra note 36, at 1254 (asserting that religious action enjoys a certain degree of
constitutional protection from both the direct and indirect effects of government enact-
ments).
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Sherbert case, free exercise cases consisted of attacks on the validity of
laws in their entirety, whereas after Sherbert free exercise adjudication
focused on requests for exemptions to laws.75 As subsequent cases show,
however, the changes instituted in Sherbert failed to fully alleviate the
Court's ambivalence towards neutral laws that incidentally burdened reli-
gious conduct.76 In the decades following this decision, the Court's appli-
cation of Sherbert's compelling interest test failed to result in a uniform
policy of accommodation to religious groups.
C. Post Sherbert: The Rise and Fall of Strict Scrutiny Analysis
Despite its landmark holding, Sherbert did not result in a principled
and consistent basis for deciding Free Exercise cases." Rather, the Court
reached diverse results in its application of the Sherbert standard in sub-
sequent cases, especially when the government's own functioning came
under attack by religious groups.
1. Successful Cases: The Rise of Strict Scrutiny
After the Sherbert decision, challenges to state laws under the Free Ex-
ercise Clause shifted almost exclusively to requests for exemptions from
neutral laws rather than arguments in favor of striking down a law in its
entirety.78 Free exercise analysis became a "facts and circumstances" in-
75. TRIBE, supra note 36, at 1257 (asserting that the Sherbert rule dictated that refusal
to grant an exemption to religious groups, absent a compelling state interest, constituted
hostility to religion).
76. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 262 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (assert-
ing that neutral laws of general applicability need not be justified by compelling state
interests).
77. Professor Tribe argues that in the cases following Sherbert, the Court no longer
utilized the direct-indirect or the belief-action distinctions in their analysis of religious
claims. TRIBE, supra note 36, at 1262-63. Tribe explains that this may be because those
later cases involved secular choices that incidentally created a burden on religious activity
rather than burdens that forced an individual to choose between adherence to religious
practices or government benefits. Id.
It is interesting to note that in oral argument for the case Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) (discussed infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text), counsel for the state of
Wisconsin argued that the Court should employ the belief-action dichotomy to compel the
Old Order Amish to keep their children in the educational system until the age of 16. See
MAY rr PLEASE THE COURT 96 (Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds., 1993). This distinc-
tion, however, was not made by the Court when it subsequently granted an exemption to
the educational laws in favor of the Amish. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216.
78. Probably the sole deviation from this trend is reflected in McDaniel v. Paty, 435
U.S. 618 (1978), in which the Court struck down a law that denied members of the clergy
eligibility as delegates in the state constitutional convention. Id. at 621. In striking down
the law, Chief Justice Burger quoted Sherbert, and stated that a state cannot condition the
availability of benefits on an individual's willingness to violate his religious beliefs. Id. at
626.
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quiry, providing little predictability for those preparing to challenge laws
on religious grounds.7 9
The Court granted exemptions to state laws only where it found that
the case was either indistinguishable from the facts of Sherbert or that it
was so unusual that the Court determined that the particular facts at issue
warranted an exemption. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,8° the Court granted an
exemption to Amish families whose religious beliefs compelled them to
terminate their children's schooling before the age legally required by the
state of Wisconsin.81 The Court held that although the state's interest in
maintaining educational standards for all children was important, that in-
terest did not justify the potential damage to both the Amish culture and
its religious practices. 82
Similarly, in Thomas v. Review Board,83 the Court granted an exemp-
tion from state unemployment compensation laws to a Jehovah's Witness
practitioner who quit his job at a munitions factory because of his reli-
gious objections to the Vietnam War.8' The majority found the case to be
indistinguishable from Sherbert, as both cases involved individuals who
were forced to choose between their religious beliefs and their receipt of
government benefits.8 5 The Court found that the state's interests in re-
79. See TRIBE, supra note 36, at 1258 (explaining that some of the "facts" considered
in free exercise cases that determine the amount of deference the Court will afford to state
enactment include the degree of choice involved in the program, the degree of harm posed
to the religious observer in refusing to partake in a government required activity, and the
identity of the person seeking the exemption (i.e., whether the law affects an adult or a
child)).
80. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
81. Id. at 234.
82. Id. at 225-26. The majority asserted that the Amish culture had been in existence
for over two centuries, during which time its members enjoyed a great deal of success in
American culture. Id. at 226-27. As such, the Court was reluctant to question the ability
of the Amish people to prepare their children successfully for life in American society. Id.
The majority argued that forcing the Amish to send their children to school past the age of
16 posed a real danger to the continued survival of the Amish culture by forcing Amish
parents to expose their children to "worldly" values explicitly rejected by their religion. Id.
at 218-19. Therefore, state interests in such an extreme case should be more important
than simply the mere desire to impose the "best possible ideal" of American life upon its
citizens. Id. at 226-27.
It is important to note the limitations on the Court's holding in this case. The Court did
not hold that a state's interest in compulsory school education is not a compelling interest.
Rather, the Court held that the burdens placed on Amish religious practice overwhelmed
the state's interest in requiring those students to attend school through the age of 16. Id. at
228.
83. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
84. Id. at 709.
85. Id. at 717. Justice Brennan articulated this similarity to Sherbert by noting that in
both cases "the employee was put to a choice between fidelity to religious belief or cessa-
tion of work." Id.
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ducing unemployment and preventing employer probes into religious be-
liefs of employees were not sufficient to justify the law's burden on the
religious practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses.16 While these cases signi-
fied a triumph for the religious groups involved, they did little to advance
broad constitutional protection for these groups.' The Court's later de-
cisions revealed a great reluctance to extend free exercise protection to
other areas of lawmaking, especially the regulation of the federal govern-
ment's own internal functioning.
2. Unsuccessful Cases: The Fall of Strict Scrutiny
Where the federal government's systems of operation were attacked by
religious groups, the Supreme Court adamantly rejected these groups'
claims for exemptions. The importance of a smoothly functioning federal
government immunized several governmental programs from Free Exer-
cise Clause challenges."8 In United States v. Lee, 9 the Court denied an
exemption to an Amish employer from participation in the Social Secur-
ity withholding program on the basis that the Amish religion forbade
acceptance of such government assistance.' While the Court acknowl-
edged that payment of Social Security taxes placed a great burden on the
Amish, that burden was justified by the government's compelling interest
in maintaining the integrity of the Social Security system.9 '
86. Id. at 718-19.
87. Id. at 720. The Court concluded: "Unless we are prepared to overrule Sherbert,
Thomas cannot be denied the benefits due him on the basis of the findings . . . that he
terminated his employment because of his religious convictions." Id. (citation omitted).
See supra note 80 for a further discussion of Free Exercise Clause challenges to the denial
of unemployment compensation benefits.
88. This approach has been termed the noncoercion approach, meaning that as long as
the government action is not actively forcing individuals to act in ways offensive to their
religious beliefs, it should not be held accountable for the mere by-products of its other-
wise religiously neutral enactment. Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REv. 143, 236 (1988).
89. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
90. Id. at 255, 261. The employer argued that since the Amish religion required the
community to care for the elderly, they would not avail themselves of the Social Security
system after one of their members retired. Id. at 257. Because of this, the employer ar-
gued that he and his fellow practitioners were entitled to an exemption from the Social
Security withholding laws similar to that allotted to self-employed individuals. Id. at 256.
91. Id. at 257-59. On balance, the Court concluded that the integrity of the Social
Security system, and the tax system as a whole, was too important to allow for exemptions.
Id. at 260.
The Court has long recognized that balance must be struck between the values of
the comprehensive social security system, which rests on a complex of actuarial
factors, and the consequences of allowing religiously based exemptions. To main-
tain an organized society that guarantees religious freedom to a great variety of
faiths requires that some religious practices yield to the common good.
Id. at 259.
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens argued that both the majority's
analysis and its conclusion were erroneous.' Justice Stevens explained
that had the majority correctly applied a strict scrutiny analysis, the mini-
mal administrative burden required to exempt the Amish from the Social
Security system would not meet the high standard required by the com-
pelling interest test.93 Moreover, Justice Stevens rejected the majority's
conclusion that the government must justify its uniform system of taxa-
tion with a compelling interest.94 Justice Stevens argued that such analy-
sis is not necessary when a federal law such as Social Security withholding
is a neutral, generally applicable law.95
The Court took the Lee rationale one step further by completely
sidestepping a formal strict scrutiny analysis in cases involving the func-
tioning of government administrative operations.96 In Bowen v. Roy,97
the Court refused to exempt Native Americans from the requirement
that they receive and use a Social Security number to qualify for welfare
benefits.98 The requirement was challenged by a Native American who
argued that the federal government's assignment of a Social Security
number to his daughter would "harm [her] spirit." 99 The Court refused
to apply the Sherbert compelling interest test, deferring to the govern-
ment's judgment in its management of administrative affairs."° In doing
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 262 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Stevens argued that the
government should be free from religion clause challenges when it enacts laws that do no
more than regulate the economic system: "In my opinion, it is the objector who must
shoulder the burden of demonstrating that there is a unique reason for allowing him a
special exemption for a valid law of general applicability." Id.
95. Id. at 263. Justice Stevens distinguished the Lee facts from those of Thomas and
Sherbert as Lee involved minimal intrusions on the claimants' religious beliefs, and pro-
vided impetus for individuals with fraudulent motives to join favored religious sects. Id. at
263 n.3. In contrast, unemployment compensation benefits are distributed to persons al-
ready disadvantaged. In these cases, Justice Stevens explains, individuals should be treated
as handicapped in their ability to perform work because of religious requirements. Id. As
such, the Free Exercise Clause serves as a protection against unequal treatment rather than
a promise of preferential treatment (as was requested here). Id.
96. This is consistent with Justice Scalia's assertion in Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 884 (1989), that the Court never or rarely utilized the strict scrutiny test
outside the context of unemployment compensation. See infra note 109 and accompanying
text (further discussing this idea).
97. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
98. Id. at 712.
99. Id. at 699.
100. Id. at 707-08. This holding mirrors Justice Stevens' concurrence in Lee, in which
he defended the validity of laws of general applicability. In Bowen, the majority asserted:
Absent proof of an intent to discriminate against particular religious beliefs or
against religion in general, the Government meets its burden when it demon-
strates that a challenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and uni-
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so, the Court distinguished between laws that compel individuals to act in
ways repugnant to their religious beliefs from those laws that simply act
as a tool to aid the government in its own internal administration.' 1
Similarly, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,10 2 the
Court refused to compel the federal government to modify its plan to
build a road through lands owned by the National Forest Service that
were considered sacred by certain Native American groups.'0 3 The Court
declined the application of a strict scrutiny analysis as it could not distin-
guish the case from Bowen."° Despite the concededly heavy burden on
the Indians' religious practices, the Court refused to dictate to the gov-
ernment how it must use its own land.'0 5
As these cases show, the Supreme Court's adoption of the compelling
interest test in Sherbert for all state actions burdening religious activity
was short-lived, particularly where litigants attempted to constrain fed-
eral government functions."° The Supreme Court subsequently rede-
fined its policy when it addressed the incidental burdens of neutral law in
Employment Division v. Smith.' °
D. Deferential Review: Employment Division v. Smith
The Supreme Court attempted to explain its seemingly unpredictable
line of free exercise cases in Employment Division v. Smith. In Smith,
two members of the Native American Church were fired from their jobs
at a drug rehabilitation center for ingesting the drug peyote during a reli-
gious ceremony.'" They sought an exemption from the state's unem-
ployment compensation law that denied them benefits for the dismissal
form in its application, is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public
interest.
Id.
101. Id. at 699. The Court stated:
Never to our knowledge has the Court interpreted the First Amendment to
require the Government itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will
further his or her spiritual development or that of his or her family. The Free
Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to con-
duct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of
particular citizens.
Id.
102. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
103. Id. at 458.
104. Id. at 452. "The Constitution does not, and courts cannot, offer to reconcile the
various competing demands on government, many of them rooted in sincere religious be-
lief, that inevitably arise in so diverse a society as ours." Id.
105. Id. at 451.
106. See infra notes 108-23 and accompanying text.
107. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
108. Id. at 874.
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because their drug use was considered "work related misconduct."'"
The Court refused to apply the Sherbert compelling interest test, reason-
ing that it should accord no such deference to a neutral law of general
applicability. 1 ' Because the Oregon drug law at issue did not expressly
target religious practices, the majority held that the state need not justify
the law's incidental burden on religious activities with a compelling
interest.'
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, explained that while belief itself
is absolutely exempt from government regulation, conduct is not." 2 As
long as the state remains neutral in enacting generally applicable laws, it
has no obligation to prevent whatever incidental burdens those laws may
place on religious conduct.1 3 The majority justified its decision by rely-
ing on the history of the Free Exercise Clause, asserting that the Court
had applied a strict scrutiny analysis in two instances: when evaluating
religious claims involving a second constitutional value, 1 4 and when eval-
uating cases involving requests for exemptions to state unemployment
compensation laws." 5 Since the Oregon law in Smith was a neutral law
109. Id.
110. Id. at 883. Petitioners Smith and Black were counselors at an Oregon drug reha-
bilitation clinic. Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 662 (1988) [hereinafter Smith I].
After they were arrested and prosecuted for ingesting a small amount of the drug peyote at
a ceremony of the Native American Church, they were fired from their positions because
they violated the rehabilitation center's policy on drug and alcohol abuse. Id. at 662-63.
Petitioners were subsequently denied state unemployment compensation. Id. at 663. They
appealed their case to the United States Supreme Court, which refused to decide whether
the State of Oregon was required to exempt the petitioners from their compensation laws,
and remanded the case to the state court for a determination of whether Oregon peyote
use during religious ceremonies is in fact illegal under Oregon law. Id. at 673. On remand,
the Oregon court found that the state could constitutionally criminalize peyote use. Smith
v. Employment Div., 763 P.2d 146 (Or. 1988), rev'd, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Relying on this
finding, Justice Scalia argued that if a state could outlaw religiously motivated conduct
under the Constitution, it can also place the "lesser burden of denying unemployment com-
pensation benefits to persons who engage in that conduct." Smith, 494 U.S. at 875 (citing
Smith I, 485 U.S. at 670).
111. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
112. Id. at 879.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 881-83. The first circumstance involves "hybrid" cases in which a free exer-
cise claim was made in addition to another constitutional claim. Id. at 881. See, e.g., Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-32 (1972) (tying free exercise claim to a claim of the
right of parents to direct the education of their children); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 302 (1940) (tying free exercise claim to a claim under the Free Speech clause); see also
supra notes 45-50, 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing Cantwell and Yoder).
115. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-84. The second situation is where the Court utilized the
strict scrutiny analysis in those cases involving requests for exemptions to unemployment
compensation laws as in Sherbert. This is because "[t]he Sherbert test, it must be recalled,
was developed in a context that lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of the
reasons for the relevant conduct." Id. at 884 (emphasis added). Justice Scalia explained
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of general applicability and did not fall into one of the above-mentioned
exceptions, the Court needed to make no further inquiry to determine its
validity.116
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor objected to the majority's
restriction of the compelling interest test in free exercise cases.' 7 Justice
O'Connor argued that the protection afforded by the First Amendment
to religious beliefs should extend equally to religious acts." 8 Justice
O'Connor further condemned the majority's deference to neutral laws as
unrealistic, asserting that the majority would grant protection only to
those "extreme and hypothetical" cases where a state directly targets a
religious activity for unjust burdens." 9
Justice O'Connor proposed that the Court evaluate cases by determin-
ing whether "the burden on the specific plaintiffs before [the Court] is
constitutionally significant and whether the particular criminal interest
asserted by the State ... is compelling."' 2 This approach would require
a state to justify any significant burden on a religious exercise with a com-
pelling governmental interest utilizing the least restrictive means."' Jus-
tice O'Connor found that Oregon had placed an extreme burden on the
Native American religious practitioners by effectively outlawing an im-
portant facet of their religion. 22 Applying the compelling interest test,
however, Justice O'Connor concluded that the state's interest in control-
ling the traffic of drugs was sufficiently important to uphold the Oregon
law.
123
that although the Court has utilized the compelling interest test at other times, these hy-
brid cases are the only instances where a free exercise challenge has actually been success-
ful. Id. at 883-84.
116. Id. at 890.
117. Id. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 893.
119. Id. at 894.
120. Id. at 899. But see Lupu, supra note 10, at 51 (explaining that the concept of
evaluating the "burden" on the challenging religious group is simply too difficult to pro-
vide a workable analysis of free exercise challenges).
121. Smith, 494 U.S. at 894-95 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Additionally, Justice
O'Connor disagreed with the majority's characterization of the history of the free exercise
analysis. Id. at 899. "Once it has been shown that a government regulation or criminal
prohibition burdens the free exercise of religion, we have consistently asked the govern-
ment to demonstrate that unbending application of its regulation to the religious objector
'is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest."' Id. at 899 (quoting
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982)).
122. Id. at 903.
123. Id. at 904-05. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall, agreed with Justice O'Connor's support of the compelling interest test.
Id. at 907 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). However, the dissent found the state's interest not
strong enough to justify the burdens it placed on the practitioners' religious practice. Id. at
909.
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The Smith decision marks a turning point in free exercise jurispru-
dence. While the approach itself is new, the concepts are quite familiar,
as the Smith majority in effect applies the Reynolds standard of deference
to neutral, generally applicable laws prohibiting religiously motivated ac-
tion. 24 Following Smith, claims under the Free Exercise Clause will be
effectively analyzed as though the Sherbert case did not exist.
E. Reaction to Smith: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
The Smith holding was extremely controversial. Some commentators
praised the holding because it relieved courts of the responsibility of ap-
plying the compelling interest test, which led to inconsistent and often
unfair results."z Other scholars, however, strongly objected to the hold-
ing, asserting that Smith robbed the Free Exercise Clause of any power to
protect minority religions."2 Responding to criticism of the Smith deci-
sion, the United States House of Representatives passed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1990.127 If passed into law, this Act would
codify the Sherbert strict scrutiny test for all federal and state enactments,
effectively abrogating Smith. 128
In its analysis, the dissent found persuasive the fact that peyote played a minute part in
the overall drug trade, and that other states had granted exemptions for religious use of
peyote. Id. at 917. The dissent also noted that Oregon had granted previous exemptions
of a similar nature, such as an exemption for communion wine during Prohibition. Id. at
913 n.6.
124. Id. at 878 (majority opinion). Indeed, Justice Scalia cites Reynolds as support for
the proposition that neutral laws that burden religious action have consistently been up-
held against challenges by religious groups. Id. at 879.
125. Marshall, supra note 11, at 359. Marshall argues that the Sherbert holding allowed
the Court to grant deference to religious groups in ways unfair to secular groups. Id. at
360. This deference created an unfair disparity between the Court's treatment of religious
and secular reasons for exemptions to laws. Id. Marshall concludes that the Smith hold-
ing promises to bring a new uniformity to the law that has been absent for almost thirty
years. Id.
126. Laycock, supra note 13, at 4. "If the Court intends to defer to any formally neutral
law restricting religion, then it has created a legal framework for persecution, and persecu-
tions will result." Id. One court applied Smith to a request for an exemption to a state law
that required a family to violate their religion by submitting a family member to an au-
topsy. The judge stated that "[wihile I feel constrained to apply the majority's opinion to
the instant case, I cannot do this without expressing my profound regret and my own
agreement with Justice Blackmun's forceful dissent." Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558,
559 (D.R.I. 1990).
127. H.R. 5377, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1991).
128. Id. The House version of this bill requires a compelling state interest justify any
restriction on an individual's free exercise of religion. Id. This bill would also allow indi-
viduals to bring suit against the governmental body violating the law, and allows for collec-
tion of attorney's fees by the individual if the suit is successful. Id. Senators Biden and
Hatch proposed the legislation in the Senate in support of Justice O'Connor's view of
religious exercise in Smith. 136 CONG. REc. S17,330 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990). Senator
1994]
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The limits of the Smith decision, however, remained unexplored.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah'29 provided the
Supreme Court with another opportunity to define the parameters of the
Free Exercise Clause, in particular the meaning of Smith's dispositive
phrase "neutral law of general applicability."
II. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE UNDER SMITH. CHURCH OF THE
LUKUMI BABALU AYE, INC. v. CTY OF HIALEAH
In Lukumi, the Supreme Court's majority opinion sought to apply the
Smith criteria to the ordinances enacted by the Hialeah, Florida city
council.'30 The majority explained that the Smith decision requires that
lawmakers enact laws that are both neutral and generally applicable,' 31
and that any law that does not meet these requirements must be narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.' 32 After a thorough analy-
sis of the Hialeah ordinances, the majority concluded that the ordinances
were neither neutral nor generally applicable and were not justified by
compelling state interests.133 Thus, a unanimous Court reversed the dis-
trict court's validation of the Hialeah ordinances.
A. Neutrality of the Hialeah Ordinances
The majority explained that under Smith, the Free Exercise Clause
provides religious groups with protection from laws that discriminate on
the basis of belief, or discriminate against conduct solely because it is
Biden, speaking on behalf of the Senate Judiciary Committee, explained that like Justice
O'Connor, he agreed that Oregon had a right to outlaw peyote use. Id. at S17,330-31.
However, in supporting this right, the Supreme Court had withdrawn necessary First
Amendment protection for other, valid exercises of religious belief. Id. at S17,331. Sena-
tor Biden stated that a compromise could be found in a case-by-case analysis of laws that
place burdens on religious activity. Id. "This bill is needed because even neutral, general
laws can unnecessarily restrict religious freedom. The new rule, announced by the
Supreme Court in Employment Division versus Smith, will affect virtually every religion in
this country. It will erode religious freedom." Id.
As a response to the restrictive Smith test many states have reinterpreted their own state
constitutions expansively, as requiring a compelling interest test. See Stuart G. Parsell,
Note, Revitalization of the Free Exercise of Religion Under State Constitutions: A Response
to Employment Division v. Smith, 68 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 747 (1993).
129. 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
130. Id. at 2226. Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion. Id. at 2222.
131. Id. at 2226. While Justice Kennedy asserted the separateness of these two require-
ments, he also noted their similarities. "Neutrality and general applicability are interre-
lated, and, as becomes apparent in this case, failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely
indication that the other has not been satisfied." Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2233-34; see supra note 18 (outlining the text of the Hialeah ordinances).
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undertaken for religious reasons. 3 If a law's objective is the suppression
of religious practice, it is not considered neutral under the Free Exercise
Clause. To determine the object of the Hialeah ordinances, the majority
first examined the text of the ordinances, explaining that a law is not neu-
tral if, on its face, the law "refers to a religious practice without a secular
meaning discernable from the language or context. ' 135 The majority con-
cluded that the ordinances were facially neutral despite references to the
terms "sacrifice" and "ritual"-words often associated with religious
practices. 36
Despite the apparent facial validity of the ordinances, the majority pro-
ceeded to analyze the ordinances as they would operate. The majority
explained that the Free Exercise Clause protects religion from both overt
hostility and from "religious gerrymanders": legislative acts designed to
target religious conduct but whose purpose may not be readily discern-
able from the text of the ordinance. 137 Religious gerrymandering based
on a discriminatory motive can be uncovered from an analysis of the law
in operation.13 The majority found that the Hialeah legislature targeted
134. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2226. The majority cites McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618
(1978), as an example a case involving a non-neutral law. See supra note 78 (noting that
the law at issue in McDaniel excluded members of certain religions from holding public
office solely on the basis of their religion). The majority cites Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345
U.S. 67 (1953), as a case exemplifying a law that failed the general applicability prong.
Fowler concerned the constitutionality of a Rhode Island ordinance that prohibited
speeches and other public addresses in public parks. Id. at 69. When a Jehovah's Witness
was prosecuted under the ordinance for holding a religious service in a public area, he
challenged the law arguing that other religious groups (such as Catholics) were permitted
to hold "church services" in the park. Id. at 68-69. A unanimous Court struck down the
law, holding that it was impermissible under the First Amendment to enact a law outlawing
the religious activities of some religions, but approving similar behavior by other religions
merely because they are more "popular." Id. at 70.
135. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2227. While the Court's opinion admittedly goes beyond the
text of the ordinances in its analysis, as Justice Kennedy explains, the text remains the most
logical starting point, as facial neutrality is "the minimum requirement of neutrality." Id.
136. Id. Although the majority acknowledged that the words "ritual" and "sacrifice"
have strong religious associations, these terms also have secular meanings. Id. Thus, the
majority noted that it was possible to read the Hialeah ordinances as religiously neutral.
Id.
137. Id. Justice Kennedy explained that "[o]fficial action that targets religious conduct
for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of
facial neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which is
masked, as well as overt." Id.
138. Id. at 2228. Justice Kennedy emphasized that laws that impact adversely on reli-
gious practices are not per se invalid under the Free Exercise Clause. Id. However, a law's
adverse impact can be important evidence of the law's impermissible targeting of a reli-
gious practice. Id.
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 43:641
the practice of Santeria through the city's official resolutions139 and oper-
ation of the regulations in tandem. When the three ordinances were
viewed as a whole, they operated to target the Santeria religion for dis-
criminatory treatment, yet exempted virtually every other type of animal
killing." °
The Court focused on the Hialeah ordinances that prohibited the sacri-
fice of animals,' 4 ' the keeping of animals for sacrifice, 42 and cruelty to
animals.14  The majority first found that the definition of sacrifice was
drafted to prohibit exclusively Santeria slaughter, exempting virtually any
other type of animal killing.'" In contrast, Ordinance 87-52 prohibited
keeping any animal used for "sacrifice or slaughter" with the intent to use
such an animal for food purposes. 45 This ordinance outlawed the ritual
killing of animals, yet exempted licensed food establishments, animals
raised for food purposes (subject to appropriate zoning ordinances) and,
implicitly, Jewish Kosher slaughter of animals.' 46 Finally, the majority
139. Id. These enactments were in the form of official resolutions of the Hialeah legis-
lature. Unlike the ordinances, these resolutions were not facially neutral. One such reso-
lution declares that "residents and citizens of the City of Hialeah have expressed their
concern that certain religions may propose to engage in practices which are inconsistent
with public morals, peace or safety." HIALEAH, FLA., RESOLUTnON No. 87-66 (1987),
quoted in Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2227-28. The Court noted the facially discriminatory na-
ture of the resolutions, when it stated that "[n]o one suggests, and on this record it cannot
be maintained, that city officials had in mind a religion other than Santeria." Lukumi, 113
S. Ct. at 2228. For the full text of the resolution see supra note 18.
140. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2228-30.
141. HIALEAH, FLA., REsOLUTION No. 87-40 (1988).
142. HIALEAMH, FLA., RESOLUTION No. 87-52 (1988).
143. HIALEAH, FLA., RESOLUTION No. 87-71 (1988).
144. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2228; see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1989), affd, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991),
rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993) (explaining that Hialeah Resolution No. 87-52 prohibits the
ritual slaughter of animals but allows for state or federal laws to carve out exceptions such
as those for Jewish kosher slaughter). The Supreme Court concluded that Resolution No.
87-52 "ensured that, although Santeria sacrifice is prohibited, killings that are no more
necessary or humane in almost all other circumstances are unpunished." Lukumi, 113 S.
Ct. at 2228.
145. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2228.
146. Id. The Court stated:
Again, the burden of the ordinance, in practical terms, falls on Santeria adherents
but almost no others: If the killing is-unlike most Santeria sacrifices-unaccom-
panied by the intent to use the animal for food, then it is not prohibited by Ordi-
nance 87-52; if the killing is specifically for food but does not occur during the
course of "any type of ritual," it again falls outside the prohibition; and if the
killing is for food and occurs during the course of a ritual, it is still exempted if it
occurs in a properly zoned and licensed establishment and involves animals "spe-
cifically raised for food purposes." A pattern of exemptions parallels the pattern
of narrow prohibitions. Each contributes to the gerrymander.
Id. at 2228-29; see supra note 18 (setting forth the text of Hialeah Ordinance 87-40).
1994] Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
found that Hialeah's anticruelty ordinance was designed to target
Santeria sacrifice.147 Furthermore, under Ordinance 87-40, which prohib-
ited the unnecessary killing of animals in practice, almost every conceiva-
ble type of animal killing except Santeria sacrifice was considered,'necessary. '' 148
The Court found that in operation, the ordinances that restricted reli-
gious sacrifice of animals were not narrowly tailored by the Hialeah legis-
lature to meet their stated ends. 149 For example, an ordinance that would
regulate the disposal of organic garbage would have served the city's
health concerns as effectively as a flat prohibition on animal sacrifice. 150
In addition, the majority noted that Hialeah's anticruelty ordinance could
have regulated the method of slaughter, rather than the religious context
in which such slaughter occurs.' 5 '
In a section joined only by Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy asserted
that, as in equal protection cases, the Court should consider both "direct
and circumstantial" evidence, such as the ordinances' legislative record
and contemporaneous statements made by the legislators in determining
legislative motive. 52 Justice Kennedy cited as important evidence of leg-
islative motive statements made by Hialeah city council members imme-
diately prior to the enactment of the ordinances, showing that the city
truly intended to prohibit only Santeria sacrifice.'53
147. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2230-31.
148. Id. at 2229. The Court stated:
Killings for religious reasons are deemed unnecessary, whereas most other kill-
ings fall outside the prohibition. The city, on what seems to be a per se basis,
deems hunting, slaughter of animals for food, eradication of insects and pests and
euthanasia of animals as necessary. There is no indication in the record that re-
spondent has concluded that hunting or fishing for sport is unnecessary. Indeed,
one of the few reported Florida cases decided under § 828.12 concludes that the
use of live rabbits to train greyhounds is not unnecessary.
Id. (citation omitted).
149. Id. The city argued that a more narrow regulation would be unenforceable be-
cause the majority of Santeria sacrifice occurs in private homes. Id. The majority con-
cluded that this reasoning defied logic, as a total prohibition on sacrifice did nothing to
alleviate these enforcement problems. Id.
150. Id. at 2229-30.
151. Id. at 2230. The Court did not consider the intent of Resolution 87-72, concluding
that because this ordinance was passed on the same day as the other three, Hialeah city
council members had similar intent for all four ordinances. Id.
152. Id. at 2230-31.
153. Id. The Court observed:
The minutes and taped excerpts of the June 9 session [of the Hialeah City Coun-
cil] ... evidence significant hostility exhibited by residents, members of the city
council, and other city officials toward the Santeria religion and its practice of
animal sacrifice.
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The majority concluded that since the primary object of the ordinances
was the suppression of Santeria religious sacrifice, the ordinances were
not neutral under the Free Exercise Clause. 54 The majority then pro-
ceeded to examine the "general applicability of the Hialeah
ordinances."' 55
B. General Applicability of the Hialeah Ordinances
The majority explained that a generally applicable law is one that im-
poses burdens evenly upon religious and nonreligious activity alike.'56
Thus, a law that selectively burdens only religious activity violates the
Free Exercise Clause. 57 The majority concluded that the Hialeah ordi-
nances were underinclusive, meaning that their prohibition of religious
exercise did not adequately address the goals stated by the legislature. 58
For instance, while the city enacted its sacrifice prohibition to prevent
health risks related to consumption of uninspected meats, the city did not
enact similar provisions preventing hunters, fishermen, or small-scale
farmers from consuming uninspected meats. 59 Similarly, the anticruelty
ordinance prohibited animal sacrifice, but did not prohibit arguably less
humane means of animal slaughter such as fishing, or the intentional in-
fliction of pain upon an animal "'in the interest of medical science.'"160
Furthermore, the city prohibited Santeria sacrifice because of the public
health threat caused by the practitioner's improper disposal of animal
This history discloses the object of the ordinances to target animal sacrifice by
Santeria worshippers because of its religious motivation.
Id. at 2231.
154. Id. The Court stated:
The pattern we have recited discloses animosity to Santeria adherents and their
religious practices; the ordinances by their own terms target this religious exer-
cise; the texts of the ordinances were gerrymandered with care to proscribe reli-
gious killings of animals but to exclude almost all secular killings; and the
ordinances suppress much more religious conduct than is necessary in order to
achieve the legitimate ends asserted in their defense.
Id.
155. Id. at 2232.
156. Id. The majority explained that while all laws are discriminatory to a certain de-
gree, a law violates Smith's general applicability prong when "a legislature decides that the
governmental interests it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against con-
duct with a religious motivation." Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. The Court explained that "[diespite the city's proffered interest in preventing
cruelty to animals, the ordinances are drafted with care to forbid few killings but those
occasioned by religious sacrifice." Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.02 (West 1991)). Other examples of animal
killings include extermination of animals, euthanasia, destruction of animals for "humani-
tarian reasons," or killing by placing poison in one's yard. Id.
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carcasses, but failed to enact a similar measure designed to prevent im-
proper disposal of organic waste by restaurants or other nonreligious
entities.
161
Finally, the majority examined the ordinance's prohibition of animal
slaughter in areas not zoned for slaughterhouses. 62 Although the ordi-
nance exempted groups that slaughtered small numbers of animals for
sale, no such exemption existed for religious slaughter.163 Moreover, the
city could not explain how such a distinction would advance its purported
ends.' 6" The majority found that because Hialeah enacted "'a prohibi-
tion that society is prepared to impose upon [Santeria worshippers] but
not upon itself,"1 65 the ordinances violated the general applicability re-
quirement previously articulated in Smith ."
C. Compelling Interests Behind the Hialeah Ordinances
The majority evaluated the interests behind the Hialeah ordinances,
explaining that any law that discriminates against religious practice is
valid only in rare cases justified by compelling state interests.' 67 Compel-
ling interests are those state concerns of "the highest order" that are nar-
rowly tailored to achieve solely these particular interests}
68
However, the majority refused to analyze the Hialeah ordinances
under the compelling state interest test, stating effectively that any ordi-
nance so patently underinclusive could not possibly further compelling
ends.' 69 The Court explained that the ordinances outlawed only religious
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2223.
163. Id. The Court found that "[t]he ordinance includes an exemption for 'any person,
group, or organization' that 'slaughters or processes for sale, small numbers of hogs and/or
cattle per week in accordance with an exemption provided by state law."' Id. (quoting
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.24(3) (West 1991)).
164. Id. "Although the city has classified Santeria sacrifice as slaughter, subjecting it to
this ordinance, it does not regulate other killings for food in like manner." Id.
165. Id. (quoting The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment)). The Florida Star, a free speech case, involved a
challenge to a Florida state court judgment against a newspaper that negligently printed
the name of a rape victim in violation of Florida law. The Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 527-29.
The Court struck down the lower court's judgment, explaining that the statute imposing
liability on "instrument[s] of mass communication," id. at 540, without imposing liability
for other means of communicating the identity of victims was too underinclusive to achieve
the state's stated goal of protecting victim privacy. Id. at 537-41.
166. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2233. "This precise evil is what the requirement of general
applicability is designed to prevent." Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. The majority viewed the fact that the ordinances were not narrowly tailored as
prima facie evidence that the City failed to achieve compelling governmental interests. Id.
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activity, leaving unregulated conduct that produces equal or greater
harms of the same nature. Thus, because the Hialeah ordinances do so
little to achieve their stated ends, the Court could not consider those ends
compelling.
170
D. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
In a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Scalia questioned the majority's distinction between laws that are neutral
and laws that are generally applicable.' 7 ' Under Justice Scalia's analyti-
cal framework, a law that "by [its] terms" targets religious activity for
discriminatory treatment would fail the neutrality prong of the Smith
analysis while a law that targets religious activity through its "design, con-
struction, or enforcement" would fail the general applicability prong.'
72
Justice Scalia found Justice Kennedy's consideration of legislative his-
tory of the Hialeah ordinances particularly troubling, arguing the impos-
sibility of discovering the primary motive of any legislative body.
7 3
Justice Scalia argued that this consideration is inappropriate under a First
Amendment analysis, because the First Amendment is concerned with
the effects of legislative actions, not their underlying motivation.1
74
Therefore, according to Justice Scalia, the Court should focus its search
170. Id. at 2234 (citing The Florida Star v. B.J.F. 491 U.S. 524, 541-42 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). Because the ordinances were both over
and underinclusive "[tihere can be no serious claim" that the interests asserted by the city
"justify the ordinances." Id.
171. Id. at 2239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice
Scalia did not see a necessity in drawing a clear distinction between laws that are neutral
and laws that are generally applicable. Id. He viewed the terms as "substantially over-
lap[ing]." Id.
172. Id. Note that although Justice Scalia would "draw a line" between neutrality and
general applicability "somewhat different[ly] from the Court's," he cited to the same two
cases cited by the majority-McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), and Fowler v. Rhode
Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953)-as illustrative of the two concepts. See supra note 134 for a
discussion of these cases.
173. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. 2239. Justice Scalia argued that it is virtually impossible to
determine the "motive" of a legislative body by simply examining the statements made by
some of the legislators. Id. Justice Scalia cited United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968), in which the Supreme Court refused to hold that an ordinance prohibiting the
burning of draft cards targeted expressive behavior, despite a strong legislative history in-
dicating that the legislators were specifically opposed to the expressive aspects of this be-
havior. Id. at 383-84.
174. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2240. Justice Scalia argued that the Court should focus on
the effects of the laws, rather than intentions of the legislators. Justice Scalia explained
that "[hiad the Hialeah City Council set out resolutely to suppress the practices of
Santeria, but ineptly adopted ordinances that failed to do so, I do not see how those laws
could be said to 'prohibi[t] the free exercise' of religion." Id. (citing U.S. CoNsT. amend. I)
(alteration in original).
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for legislative intent solely on an examination of the text of a law and its
subsequent effect.
E. Justice Souter's Concurrence and the Invalidity of Smith
In his separate concurrence, Justice Souter argued against employing
the Smith analysis for First Amendment challenges to state actions.175
Justice Souter disagreed with the Court's characterization of "neutral"
laws, arguing that neutrality should encompass more than just absence of
legislative hostility towards a religious group. 76 Justice Souter first ex-
plained that while the Free Exercise Clause requires government neutral-
ity towards religious practice, such neutrality can take two different
forms.1 7 7 First, "formal neutrality" as exemplified by the Smith analysis
requires that the government enact laws that do not as their primary ob-
jective discrimination against religion.' 7s This, in Justice Souter's opin-
ion, is the minimal protection that the Free Exercise Clause should afford
to a religious group. The second type of neutrality, "substantive neutral-
ity," requires that the government accommodate religious groups by af-
fording them exemptions from even formally neutral laws.' 79 Because
the Hialeah ordinances were not neutral under either definition of the
term, Justice Souter agreed with the majority that the ordinances violated
175. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
176. Id. at 2243-44.
177. Id. at 2240.
178. Id. Formal neutrality is the noncontroversial principle of the Smith doctrine. See
supra notes 107-23 (discussing the Smith decision). Justice Souter argued that while few
people would assert that the Free Exercise Clause guarantees protection from openly dis-
criminatory behavior, the extent to which the Court should impose a more expansive defi-
nition of neutrality to protect less obvious discrimination was the real issue of both Smith
and Lukumi. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2240.
179. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2241. "Substantive neutrality" refers to an expanded defini-
tion of neutrality that guarantees greater Free Exercise Clause protection. Id. Substantive
neutrality would guarantee protection from the incidental effects of general laws, and
could compel an exemption. Id. For instance, a secular law prohibiting alcohol consump-
tion would burden those religions whose rituals include alcohol, such as Catholicism or
Judaism. Id. Justice Souter argued that substantive neutrality would require governmental
accommodation of religion by clearly providing a need for exemptions from generally ap-
plicable laws. Id.
Justice Souter concluded that the use of these neutrality principles in free exercise cases
will depend on the definition of the protection provided by the Free Exercise Clause: "If
the Free Exercise Clause secures only protection against deliberate discrimination, a for-
mal requirement will exhaust the Clause's neutrality command; if the Free Exercise Clause
•.. safeguards a right to engage in religious activity free from unnecessary governmental
interference, the Clause requires substantive, as well as formal, neutrality." Id. at 2242
(footnote omitted); see also Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated
Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993 (1990) (discussing the various forms
of neutrality as they have been applied to the religion clauses of the Constitution).
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the Free Exercise Clause.18 As such, Lukumi concerns itself with defin-
ing the "minimal" protections of the Free Exercise Clause. 8  Free exer-
cise analysis should address the more troublesome case that arises when
nondiscriminatory laws burden religious exercise.182
Justice Souter also reevaluated the soundness of the Smith decision in
terms of its legal reasoning and precedential value.1 83 Because Smith did
not expressly overrule any of the prior Free Exercise Clause case law,
Justice Souter noted a "tension" between these cases, which he believed
the Court should address in future cases.'8
Justice Souter further challenged the Smith Court's characterization of
prior free exercise precedent,8 5 concluding that the Court had previously
applied strict scrutiny to all free exercise challenges, not just to "hybrid"
cases or unemployment compensation cases as Smith had stated.'
86 Jus-
180. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2250. Justice Souter concluded that the Hialeah ordinances
violated even formal neutrality by targeting the Santeria religion for discriminatory treat-
ment. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. Justice Souter stated that "[tjhe question whether the protections of the Free
Exercise Clause also pertain if the law at issue, though nondiscriminatory in its object, has
the effect nonetheless of placing a burden on religious exercise is not before the Court
today." Id.
183. Id. at 2243. In contrast to Lukumi, Justice Souter described Smith as the more
"typical" free exercise case. Id. Lukumi is, on the other hand, "a rare example of a law
actually aimed at suppressing religious exercise." Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. Justice Souter observed:
[T]he Court has addressed the concepts of neutrality and general applicability by
indicating, in language hard to read as not foreclosing the Smith rule, that the
Free Exercise Clause embraces more than mere formal neutrality, and that formal
neutrality and general applicability are not sufficient conditions for free-exercise
constitutionality ....
Id.
186. Id. Justice Souter supported his argument with statements from Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 239 (1972), Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 717 (1981), and
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987), which assert in
various forms that legislators must provide exemptions from even neutral laws of general
applicability.
With regard to "hybrid" cases, Justice Souter explained that while other constitutional
values may have been implicated in cases like Yoder and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940), "[n]either opinion, however, leaves any doubt that 'fundamental claims of reli-
gious freedom [were] at stake."' Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2244 (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at
221) (alteration in original). See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Yoder decision and supra notes 45-50 for a discussion of the Cantwell decision.
Moreover, Justice Souter argued that the "hybrid" exception to the Smith rule would even-
tually "swallow the Smith rule," as most free exercise claims would conceivably implicate
an additional constitutional value. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2244-45.
Next, Justice Souter attacked Smith's exception for governmental processes that in-
volved a "system of individual exemptions." Id. at 2245. Justice Souter noted that such
exceptions had been rejected by the Court in previous cases, id. (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476
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tice Souter argued that the Court consistently focused its inquiry on the
burden placed on the challenging religious group, rather than the charac-
ter of the law being challenged.' 87 As such, he concluded that the Court's
interpretations "[did] not include a comfortable fit with settled law."'"
Had the Court wished to limit the extent to which the Free Exercise
Clause compels exemptions from generally applicable laws, the Court
should have argued for "moderating the language of the test, not for
eliminating constitutional scrutiny altogether.' 189
Justice Souter argued that the Smith rule has limited precedential
value, according to settled principles of stare decisis.1  He pointed to
three specific faults in the Smith opinion that limited its precedential
value: the Court prior to Smith did not adequately inform the parties of
their intent to form a new rule,191 the Smith analysis was much broader
than necessary to resolve the-actual controversy before the Court,'192 and
Smith did not consider the original intent of the Free Exercise Clause,
which would seem to support a more expansive reading of the Clause, as
in Sherbert.193 Justice Souter concluded that while Lukumi was correctly
decided, the decision left unresolved the conflict between the Smith
Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause and the interpretation
supported by the numerous cases that directly contradict but do not over-
rule the Smith rule.' 94
U.S. 693, 715-16 (1986)), and that this exception would have conceivably covered the de-
fendants Smith and Black because a criminal prohibition upheld as a neutral generally
applicable law would most certainly lend itself to individualized exemption and analysis
through the criminal trial process. Id.
187. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2243.
188. Id. at 2246-47.
189. Id. at 2246.
190. Id. at 2247-50.
191. Id. at 2247. Because Smith was not subject to the rigorous debate typically re-
quired of new rules of law, Justice Souter argued that "a constitutional rule announced sua
sponte is entitled to less deference than one addressed on full briefing and argument." Id.
(citation omitted).
192. Id. Justice Souter cited to Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Smith which was
decided under "established free exercise jurisprudence." Id. (citing Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 903 (1990)).
193. Id. "Suffice it to say that a respectable argument may be made that the pre-Smith
law comes closer to fulfilling the language of the Free Exercise Clause than the rule Smith
announced." Id. at 2248.
194. Id. at 2250. Justice Souter observed: "Our cases now present competing answers
to the question when government, while pursuing secular ends, may compel disobedience
to what one believes religion commends. The case before use is rightly decided without
resolving the existing tension, which remains for another day when it may be squarely
freed." Id.
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F. Justice Blackmun's Concurrence
In a concurrence joined by Justice O'Connor, Justice Blackmun agreed
with the Court's holding that the Free Exercise Clause prevents discrimi-
nation against religion beyond those rare cases in which lawmakers ex-
plicitly target religion for disparate treatment.195 Justice Blackmun
further argued that Smith had been wrongly decided, and that a broad
rule allowing exemptions to laws that burden religious exercise should
still apply."9 A system of broad exemptions for religious conduct should
be implemented so that only those laws backed by interests "'of the high-
est order'" are permitted to burden the free exercise of religion.'97
While Justice Blackmun agreed with the outcome of Lukumi, he chal-
lenged the majority's characterization of free exercise analysis.198 For
Justice Blackmun, laws that target religious activity, such as the Hialeah
ordinances, ipso facto violate the First Amendment. 199 Although the is-
sue was not before the Court, Justice Blackmun was concerned with the
more difficult case in which the laws do not target religious activity, yet
nonetheless continue to place heavy burdens on religious groups.2 °°
III. OUTCOME OF LUKUMI AND THE FUTURE OF FREE EXERCISE
Lukumi is a significant sign that the Supreme Court is attempting to
derive a workable analytical tool from the Smith decision that it can apply
to future free exercise cases. In Lukumi, the Court took its first step in
defining the limits of Smith's phrase "neutral law of general applicabil-
ity." While the Court will treat neutral laws with great deference, the
breadth the Court will afford Smith's requirements of neutrality and gen-
eral applicability is an important indication of which challenges will be
successful under the Free Exercise Clause. Understanding Lukumi, how-
ever, first requires an understanding of the ramifications of Smith.
195. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
196. Id. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor both disagreed with the Smith analysis when
it was first formulated. Justice Blackmun stated that "a statute that burdens the free exer-
cise of religion 'may stand only if the law in general, and the state's refusal to allow a
religious exemption in particular, are justified by a compelling interested that cannot be
served by less restrictive means."' Id. (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 907 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
197. Id. at 2251 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. For example, had the Santeria practitioners been prosecuted under a neutral
anti-cruelty statute, the case would have presented such a "difficult question." Id.
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A. The Free Exercise Clause as an Adjunct to the Equal Protection
Clause: The Aftermath of Smith
In Smith, the Supreme Court sought to create a solution to what Justice
Scalia deemed a "constitutional anomaly" in First Amendment jurispru-
dence: a Clause allowing religious-based exemptions to neutral laws.21
In creating the Smith rule, which allowed for no scrutiny of neutral laws
of general applicability, the Court adopted "formal neutrality" as identi-
fied by Justice Souter in his concurrence in Lukumi, prohibiting only
those legislative actions with the object of suppressing religious activ-
ity.2"2 This definition of neutrality contrasts with the "substantive neu-
trality" of the Sherbert test, which would require exemptions to prevent
laws which even incidentally burden religious activity.20 3
In addition to its neutrality requirement, the Smith majority described
a second requirement; that the law must be of general applicability.2" As
explained by the Court, a law violates the general applicability prong of
the Smith test when the government "in pursuit of legitimate interests...
burdens on conduct motivated by religious belief."20 5 As the ordinances
targeted only religiously motivated behavior, the majority did not define
the limits of this test as a trigger for strict scrutiny under the Free Exer-
cise Clause. 2"
How the Court subsequently defines the general applicability prong of
the Smith test will show how far it is willing to distinguish "neutrality"
under the Free Exercise Clause from that of the Equal Protection Clause
as articulated in Washington v. Davis.2" 7 In Davis, the Court rejected its
prior approach of applying a strict scrutiny standard of review to any law
that resulted in disparate treatment of minority groups.20' After Davis,
201. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990). "But we have held that
race-neutral laws that have the effect of disproportionately disadvantaging a particular ra-
cial group do not thereby become subject to compelling-interest analysis under the Equal
Protection Clause ...." Id.
202. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2242 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
203. Id. at 2241-42.
204. Id. at 2232.
205. Id.
206. Id. "In this case we need not define with precision the standard used to evaluate
whether a prohibition is of general application, for these ordinances fall well below the
minimum standard necessary to protect First Amendment rights." Id.
207. 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3
(1990). In Davis, the Court refused to strike down a mandatory testing requirement that
resulted in racial disparities, asserting that the differences were the result of larger societal
factors rather than any discriminatory motive on the part of the legislators. Davis, 426 U.S.
at 240-46.
208. Davis, 426 U.S. at 240.
19941
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disparate impact in the absence of discriminatory object would trigger
only a rational basis level of review.2' Strict scrutiny would apply only to
those laws whose disparate impact resulted from of a discriminatory legis-
lative intent.210
The Court in Lukumi attempted to apply this type of equal protection
analysis to the Hialeah ordinances.211 The majority first looked to the
face of the challenged laws, then examined their operation in an effort to
determine their purpose.212 The majority concluded that the purpose of
the Hialeah ordinances was to discriminate against the Santeria religion
because the ordinances targeted only religious behavior.21 3 Only Justices
Kennedy and Stevens would take the analysis one step further by actually
examining the "facts and circumstances" surrounding the ordinances'
enactment.214
The majority did not address the exceptional nature of Lukumi dis-
cussed by both Justice Souter and Justice Blackmun in their concur-
rences.215 Lukumi is unusual because the legislature intentionally
discriminated against a practice performed by an entire religious sect.
Like the typical equal protection case, Lukumi deals with intentional dis-
criminatory treatment of an entire class of citizens.216 As such, given the
similarity of Lukumi to the typical equal protection case, such an analysis
may well have been appropriate. However, this type of analysis is inap-
propriate for the usual free exercise case that involves individuals or
small groups requesting individualized exemptions to laws that may or
may not have been enacted with a discriminatory motive.2 17 In general,
209. Id.
210. Id. The Court stated that "the basic equal protection principle that the invidious
quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially
discriminatory purpose." Id.
211. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2227
(1993).
212. Id. at 2227-29.
213. Id. at 2233; see supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
214. Id. at 2230-31.
215. Id. at 2242 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id. at 2251
(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Blackmun stated: "It is only in the rare
case that a state or local legislature will enact a law directly burdening religious practice as
such .... A harder case would be presented if petitioners were requesting an exemption
from a generally applicable anticruelty law." Id. (citation omitted).
216. Id. at 2222-25 (majority opinion). At the time the Hialeah ordinances were en-
acted, there were approximately 50,000 to 60,000 Santeria practitioners in South Florida.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1470 (S.D.
Fla. 1989), aff'd, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
217. With a single exception, this has been the case since the Court's 1963 decision in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See supra notes 79-106 for cases that follow the
Sherbert method of analysis.
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the burdens placed on religious exercise by the challenged laws are more
often the product of indifference on the part of the legislature rather than
intentional discrimination.
The tests developed under the Equal Protection Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause seek to protect citizens from different forms of discrimi-
nation. Disparate impact analysis under the Equal Protection Clause
evaluates challenges to laws based on statistical discrepancies in the treat-
ment of minority groups.218 In this context, the Court could not fashion
an adequate remedy where the impact resulted from broad societal fac-
tors, rather than a specific identifiable discriminatory intent by the legis-
lature. 21 9 Under the Free Exercise Clause, however, the problem is much
more straightforward: the only remedies available to a religious practi-
tioner burdened by even a "neutral" law lie in either striking down the
offending law or creating an exemption for the practitioner.
The fundamental difference in the protection provided by the Equal
Protection Clause and the Free Exercise Clause is that equal protection
protects minorities from discrimination in any type of activity, while free
exercise protects individuals from discrimination against laws burdening
only their religious conduct. Applying a disparate impact analysis to free
exercise cases treats religious activity as no more valid or important than
any type of secular activity.22° If religious and secular acts are viewed
218. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548 (1972) (holding that the disproportion-
ate allocation of benefits to minorities could not be remedied on the basis of statistical
deviations alone). In Jefferson, the Court refused to "'second-guess state officials charged
with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad
of potential recipients."' Id. at 551 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487
(1970)).
219. See TRIBE, supra note 36, at 1511 (explaining the Court's difficulty in fashioning
remedies in disparate impact cases). Professor Tribe explains:
The reason black applicants failed the police department's Test 21 at a dispropor-
tionate rate was no mystery: as a group, blacks possessed disproportionately sub-
standard language skills; and that, in turn, was caused by the fact that they had
disproportionately substandard education .... The Supreme Court was under-
standably daunted by the prospect of attempting to remedy years of deprivation
and disadvantage by dealing solely with a police department admission test where
that sad legacy of racial oppression happened to come to a head.
Id.
220. Laycock, supra note 13, at 11. "[I]n applying the equal protection rule, the unique
features of religion do not require that religion be distinguished from any other human
activity. In the Court's view, religious use of peyote, or of [communion] wine, is no more
protected by the Constitution than is recreational use." Id.
Michael McConnell takes a much more simplistic approach to the differences between
free exercise and equal protection problems:
[Ilt can be said that the ideal of racial nondiscrimination is that individuals are
fundamentally equal and must be treated as such; differences based on race are
irrelevant and must be overcome. The ideal of free exercise of religion, by con-
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synonymously, the Free Exercise Clause has no independent significance
apart from the Equal Protection Clause, despite the fact that religious
freedom is a constitutionally guaranteed liberty.221
trast, is that people of different religious convictions are different and that those
differences are precious and must not be disturbed.
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI L.
Rav. 1109, 1139 (1990). Professor McConnell suggests that the courts and the legislature
treat disparities burdening religious exercise not like racial discrimination, but instead like
handicap discrimination. Id. at 1140. Each handicap is individualized and receives unique
legislative treatment. Id.; see also Stephen L. Carter, The Resurrection of Religious Free-
dom?, 107 HARV. L. REV. 118, 129 (1993) ("Hialeah would be within its rights if it sup-
pressed Santeria by accident instead of on purpose-a theory that provides a disincentive
for the city to determine whether a proposed action will harm a religion, just as the analo-
gous theory of equal protection provides a disincentive to determine whether a proposed
action will harm a racially identifiable group.").
221. McConnell, supra note 220, at 1137. Professor McConnell states:
Different clauses of the Constitution perform different functions and have differ-
ent logical structures. It is hard to see how precedents drawn from other areas of
constitutional law can have the effect of foreclosing any particular interpretation
of the Free Exercise Clause. The Free Exercise Clause is framed in terms of a
substantive liberty; there is no reason to expect it to have the same logic as the
Equal Protection Clause. Nonetheless, if the Free Exercise Clause were the only
provision of the Constitution that required exceptions from generally applicable
laws, this might give cause for reexamination. But it isn't.
Id. The religion clauses are the most strongly-worded statements in the Bill of Rights.
Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 300.
Whereas other provisions in the Bill of Rights qualify their protection of certain rights, the
religion clauses have no such qualification. Thus, while the government may not commit
"'unreasonable searches and seizures,"' id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV), or subject
individuals to "'cruel and unusual punishments,"' id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VII),
the government "'shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]."' Id.
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I) (emphasis added) (alterations in original).
There are other problems with treating the two clauses alike, specifically with the stan-
dard of review. TIreating the Free Exercise Clause as an adjunct to the Equal Protection
Clause results in a standard of deference ranging from all to nothing. The standard applied
depends to the degree of the role of the Free Exercise Clause in the Constitution, and the
degree of protection urged for religious groups. An equal protection analysis under the
Davis line of cases requires that once a showing of disparate impact is shown, the Court
apply a rational basis standard of review. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246
(1976); cf TRIE, supra note 36, at 1503 (noting that the Court rarely applied a rational
basis level of scrutiny to disparate impact cases, instead employing a presumption of
validity).
However, it is not altogether clear that this is the case under Smith. According to Smith,
once a law is deemed neutral, it is presumptively valid under the Free Exercise Clause.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-80 (1990). Thus, a law that burdens any
group in any way other than interference with the free practice of religion will receive a
rational basis review, while a law that burdens religious practice (and only religious prac-
tice) will be presumptively valid. The result is that a law that burdens a racial minority's
right to become a police officer is given greater scrutiny by the Court than a law that
prevents a member of a religious minority from practicing religiously mandated conduct.
William L. Montague, Jr., Note, Employment Division v. Smith.- Overlooking the Middle
Ground in Free Exercise Analysis, 80 Ky. L.J. 531, 548 (1992). However, because religious
1994] Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
The Court's treatment of religious claims is directly contradictory to
what many have identified as the Court's primary purpose: to protect
those in the minority from suffering from the whim of the majority.222
Some scholars see this "countermajoritarian" emphasis as the most im-
portant feature of the Supreme Court's power.223 Ideally, a judicial
countermajoritarian emphasis compensates for a minority group's lack of
legislative might.224 This power is especially important, given modern Es-
minorities may also be racial or ethnic minorities, they may qualify for protection under
both the Free Exercise and the Equal Protection Clauses. Under Smith, when a second
constitutional claim is "paired" with a free exercise claim, strict scrutiny may be required
under the "hybrid" exception to the Smith rule. Id. at 548-49; see also Bertrand Fry, Note,
Breeding Constitutional Doctrine: The Provenance and Progeny of the "Hybrid Situation"
in Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 71 TEX. L. REV. 833, 857 (1993).
222. See McConnell, supra note 220, at 1132. Professor McConnell argues that the Free
Exercise Clause prior to Smith served as an "equalizer." Id. Professor McConnell ex-
plains that only those religions that are seen as "familiar, popular, and socially acceptable"
receive consideration in the legislative process. Id. Prior to Smith, the Court used the Free
Exercise Clause to protect the rights of the minority religions that did not possess the
power to influence the political process. Id.; see also Roberto A. Torricella, Jr., Comment,
Babalu Aye Is Not Pleased: Majoritarianism and the Erosion of Free Exercise, 45 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1061, 1106 (1991) ("[The Sherbert standard] ensured... fundamental significance
to individuals-concerns that should not be resigned to the insensitive realm of the polit-
ical process.").
223. Countermajoritarianism is the product of an idea first posited by Justice Stone in
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Justice Stone stated:
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities: whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.
Id. at 153 n.4 (citations omitted). In contrast, in support of Smith's neutrality theory, Jus-
tice Scalia explained that minority religions are, in effect, left behind:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place
at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in;
but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred
to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh
the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
The result of leaving protection of religious freedom to the legislative process is that
many religions are left behind. As Stephen L. Carter argues, religions is, by far, the most
persuasive force in questioning governmental authority. See Carter, supra note 220, at 137.
This "power of resistance" is an important facet of religious freedom which should be
protected by the Courts. Id.
224. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUsT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
78 (1980). Ely argues that those individuals who disagree with the enactments of the polit-
ical majority can seek recourse through the political process. Id. This is not true for those
who do not enjoy popular or majority status. Id. Minority groups may often find that the
majority legislature has no regard for their interests, and that their only recourse is through
the judiciary. Id.
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 43:641
tablishment Clause jurisprudence that severely limits the means through
which a legislature could carve out exemptions for religious groups to
prevent burdens on religious exercise.225 The Court has, in effect, tied
the hands of both the legislature and the judiciary, leaving religious prac-
titioners with no avenue by which they may protect their religious
liberty.226
B. Future of the Law: Reviving the Free Exercise Clause
In future cases the Court should extend Smith's general applicability
requirement to protect minority interests from laws that have an unduly
burdensome effect on religious practitioners. Subsequent cases should
interpret this test as granting a similar level of protection as other First
Amendment liberties. The Court could expand the level of scrutiny it
gives to facially neutral laws to an analysis similar to that applied under
the Free Speech Clause. Under this standard, laws that incidentally bur-
den speech or expressive activity are struck down absent a substantial
state interest.227 Thus, a free expression analysis balances the "incidental
restriction[s] on alleged First Amendment freedoms"228 against the ends
sought by the legislature.229
It is settled law, however, that the Court will not apply a higher level of
scrutiny to those laws which are of general applicability yet burden
speech.230 Thus, laws that directly impact upon speech activity are sub-
225. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that a law that
exempts religious periodicals from a state sales tax unconstitutionally violates the Estab-
lishment Clause). Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Texas Monthly, argues that the Court's
treatment of legislative exemptions under the Establishment Clause amounts to a "judicial
demolition project." Id. at 29 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia explained that the
Court's treatment of legislative exemptions overrules case law based on the value of ac-
commodation of religion. Id. at 38.
226. See Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J.
1611, 1637 (1993) (arguing that even where a religious group can garner a majority vote in
a particular area, the Establishment Clause prevents that group from using its political
clout to enact laws which affirmatively aid their religion).
227. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). In O'Brien, the Supreme
Court rejected the idea that a legislative act regulated non-communicative conduct, and
instead decided that burning draft cards had a "communicative element ... sufficient to
bring into play the First Amendment." Id. at 376.
228. Id. at 377.
229. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that the State of New Hamp-
shire cannot prosecute an individual for license plate desecration obscuring on his own
license plates the state's motto "Live Free or Die"). In Wooley, the Court held that New
Hampshire's interest in state pride and appreciation were not important enough to force
an individual to display a message with which he disagrees. Id. at 710.
230. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2518 (1991) (holding that a news-
paper is not exempt from the common law theory of promissory estoppel because doing so
may hinder the newspaper's ability to speak); University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 201
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ject to a higher level of scrutiny than those whose burdens result only
indirectly from legislative action.3" Unlike a free exercise analysis, how-
ever, even these laws indirectly impacting on speech are subject to some
degree of scrutiny (as opposed to no scrutiny as required by Smith).232
Moreover, when enacting laws which may burden speech, legislatures
often consider this impact, and through careful drafting and legislative
exemption, minimize the burden on speech.233 If a legislature were to
take such care to minimize the impact on religion, it would risk running
afoul of the Establishment Clause.3 4
In sum, the Court needs to fashion a general applicability test that is
protective of religion as a constitutionally protected right, yet flexible
enough to allow legislatures to operate effectively. When laws (such as
Reynolds' polygamy statute and Smith's peyote statute) operate almost
exclusively to burden the exercise of religion, yet are viewed by the Court
as valid because these laws could hypothetically impact upon secular ac-
tivity,2 5 a severe injustice occurs. The Court's first step in redefining the
Free Exercise Clause should address these extreme cases through a more
(1989) (holding that a university is not subject to strict First Amendment scrutiny because
its peer review process may kill the speech rights of faculty members); Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 582-83 (1983) (explaining
that newspapers are not exempt on First Amendment grounds from generally applicable
tax laws).
231. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518. "[E]nforcement of such general rules against the press
is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other per-
sons or organizations." Id.
232. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that published
parodies are not subject to a tort action of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
233. Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 555 (1977) (arguing that legislatures should take affirmative steps
to prevent disproportionate burdens on racial groups as it does to protect First Amend-
ment values).
234. See Carson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1982) (holding invalid a sectarian
exemption for charitable solicitation by religious groups as violative of the Establishment
Clause). For further discussion of this issue see supra note 222.
235. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 913-14 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that peyote use encompassed but a minute part of the overall drug trade,
and as such, its limitation impacted almost exclusively on those religious sects which prac-
tice peyotism); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1878) (acknowledging that
polygamy is a practice engaged in primarily by religious groups, not widespread among
secular society), overruled by Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). There is some
question whether the decision in Reynolds would currently survive even a Lukumi-type
analysis. One need only to look at the jury instructions challenged in the Supreme Court
to infer extreme prejudice against Mormon religious practices:
[C]onsider what are to be the consequences to the innocent victims of this delu-
sion [the doctrine of polygamy]. As this contest goes on, they multiply, and there
are pure-minded women and there are innocent children,-innocent in a sense
even beyond the degree of the innocence of childhood itself. These are to be the
sufferers; and as jurors fail to do their duty, and as these cases come up in the
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expansive reading of its neutrality requirement, striking down laws that
operate to burden religious activity as their primary effect-regardless of
legislative motive.
IV. CONCLUSION
While Lukumi may show that the Court will take notice of laws that
are invidiously targeted for discriminatory treatment, most Free Exercise
challenges involve incidental burdens placed on religion by discrimina-
tory laws. The Supreme Court need not reinstate Sherbert's mandatory
compelling interest test for all laws that burden religious practice. How-
ever, subsequent cases will offer the Court a much-needed opportunity to
redefine Smith in a manner that provides deference to state legislative
bodies in some instances and equity to minority religions in others.
Gabrielle Giselle Davison
Territory of Utah, just so do these victims multiply and spread themselves over
the land.
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167-68.
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